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Abstract 
We assess the responsiveness of Senegalese onion producers to their knowledge of 
expected changes in product market conditions, whereby onions would no longer be sold 
based on volume but on weight and with labeling certifying quality. A village-level 
randomized information campaign on the upcoming introduction of these reforms 
induced significant investments by farmers in quality-enhancing inputs. Delays in the 
actual introduction of scales enables us to rigorously identify positive price effects from 
these investments. These results point to the importance of farmers’ expectations 
regarding the improved functioning of product markets in triggering technology adoption.  
Keywords: Agricultural technology, product market, quality, sub-Saharan Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
Use of basic agricultural technologies such as chemical fertilizers and improved seeds remains 
low in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly among smallholder farmers (World Bank 2007). Lack of 
access to these technologies, to information about how to use them, and to financial services all 
contribute to these low adoption rates (Jack 2011; Karlan et al. 2014). Farmers can be further 
discouraged by low prices for their products. Insufficient roads and communication 
infrastructures create high transaction costs, whereby farmers mostly participate to shallow local 
markets with limited rewards to investments in quality or yields (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; 
Suri 2011).  
This paper provides evidence on the fact that small changes in such market settings can lead to 
important production responses by farmers. We rely on a field setting in northern Senegal where 
scales were not available for onions to be weighed when sold at local collection points.ii Local 
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consignment agents (coaxers) and authorities argued that these markets were so distant from 
large consumer markets that the use of scales would discourage traders (banabanas) from 
traveling the distance and reduce market opportunities for farmers. Thus, onions were sold based 
on loosely assessed 40 kilogram bags, with preference given to overfilled ones. Farmers reacted 
to this perverse incentive by using urea-based fertilizer, producing larger although lower-quality 
(fast deteriorating due to high water content) onions with lower value on consumer markets. 
In late 2013, local authorities decided to introduce scales and quality labeling in the next 2014 
season. To assess how this change in market conditions may affect farmers’ production behavior, 
we designed an information campaign ahead of the 2014 season, randomly targeted to half of the 
villages in the vicinity of these markets, and related to the upcoming introduction of scales and 
labels. In this information campaign, farmers were told that for all producers willing to use this 
service, each bag would be duly weighed, and a sample inspected for quality. Quality grades 
ranging from 1 (best) to 3 (worst) would then be assigned to each bag, based on the proportion of 
good-/medium-/low-quality onions found in the sampled bag. The service would be free of 
charge. At the end of the season, we collected production data from each producer, irrespective 
of treatment group, who used the scale at time of commercialization. We find that farmers from 
villages targeted by the information campaign were 9 percentage points less likely to have used 
urea and 27 percentage points more likely to have used a weight- and quality-enhancing fertilizer 
(10-10-20 nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium) as compared to the control group. They were also 7 
percentage points (p-value=0.12) more likely to have sorted their onions before taking them to 
the collection point, a costly measure to enhance quality. Using data from each batch of onions 
that went through the weighing and quality certification system, we find that bags originating 
from villages where information had been provided were 16 percentage point more likely to be 
of higher quality than those from control villages.  
To identify an effect on prices, we rely on a naturally occurring time discontinuity. Local 
authorities did not grant final formal permission for the scales to be operating until a rather 
unforeseen date, late in the season.iii Until then, scale operators could measure weight and quality 
but were not allowed to reveal this information on a label attached to each bag of onion weighed. 
We collected price information on all transactions involving bags that had been weighed and 
inspected for quality and find no effect of the information campaign on the price per kilogram in 
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the days before labeling was introduced. The price of onions from the targeted villages, however, 
increased by 9 percent in the very first days following labeling. This effect may relate to traders 
being better able to sort through quality and hence better reward higher quality onions from 
treatment villages. It may also reflect increased bargaining power by farmers who produced 
higher quality onions. With imperfect attendance at meetings in treatment villages and 
information spillovers to control villages, these results are likely conservative. 
Information about, and availability of, inputs is not a significant constraint to technology 
adoption in our study setting. The area has long been the focus of agricultural extension 
activities, and access to inputs is facilitated by a relatively dense network of private retailers. 
Liquidity constraints are also unlikely to explain low adoption of improved fertilizers. While 
more expensive, the added cost of 10-10-20 is negligible compared to the overall cost of onion 
cultivation. Price information is fairly widely available in the area, with close to 60 percent of the 
farmers reporting that they know market prices per kilogram in main wholesale and consumer 
markets before taking their onions to collection points. Lastly, our study setting is one where 
producers from nearby villages bring their onions to collection points which are located on a 
fully functional national road leading to all main consumer markets – albeit several hours away. 
Our results, however, suggest that even under these conditions, lack of information about the 
specificity of products transacted on markets can be a strong impediment to technology adoption. 
Farmers’ awareness of an upcoming small change in the functioning of these markets led to a 
rapid response, inducing the delivery of higher-quality onions sold at better prices for producers. 
These results contribute to an emerging empirical literature on producers’ response to changes in 
market conditions, by further highlighting the importance of locally-specific market conditions. 
Recent improvements in communication technologies have for instance enabled farmers to more 
easily access timely information on product prices in consumer markets. In the presence of high 
transport costs however, farmers may not be able to exploit spatial arbitrage opportunities and 
instead often rely on intermediaries (Fafchamps and Vargas-Hill, 2005). Empirical evidence 
suggests that in these contexts, price information on distant markets rarely translates into 
improved price and income for farmers (e.g., Aker, 2010; Goyal, 2010; Aker and Fafchamps, 
2015; Muto and Yamano, 2009; Futch and McIntosh, 2009). Only when producers are able to 
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select destination markets does the evidence point to positive price premiums for their output 
(e.g, Jensen, 2007).  
Local arrangements between producers and intermediaries determine the extent to which price 
incentives are transmitted to farmers (e.g., Osborne, 2005; Fafchamps and Hill, 2008; Porteous, 
2016; Dillon and Dambros, 2016). Casaburi and Reed (2014) for instance, show that in settings 
of interlinked contracts between producers and intermediaries, higher quality requirements on 
destination markets lead to higher availability of loans from intermediaries to producers. In 
another paper, Casaburi et al. (2014) study the effect of rural road rehabilitation in Sierra Leone 
and find differential price transmission from intermediaries to farmers depending on remoteness 
and the extent of local surpluses. Our paper adds to this literature by studying specific market 
arrangements in a different--yet relatively common--setting of local assembly markets. In 
particular, we show that under a given set of information and transportation infrastructures, 
farmers’ awareness of relatively small changes in the functioning of these local markets can 
induce important production responses. 
In particular, our results point to the importance of farmers’ expectations regarding the effective 
assessment of their products’ quality. In a different setting, Saenger et al. (2013) find that 
Vietnamese farmers invested in enhanced quality of milk in a contractual relationship upon 
introduction of third-party quality inspection. While the third-party inspection did not find 
evidence that previous inspections by the contractor were biased, farmers were expecting this to 
be possible, thereby reducing their expected gains in quality-enhancing investments. In a more 
descriptive paper on India, Fafchamps, Vargas-Hill, and Minten (2008) show that imperfect 
measurement of a product’s quality correlates with lower investments in quality attributes by 
farmers.  To support their result, they develop a model showing that growers’ incentive to 
engage in quality-enhancing investments decreases as the cost of quality inspection increases. 
Positive inspection costs lead to under-provision of quality, up to a point when inspection costs 
are sufficiently high that no quality premium is provided and no farmer uses quality-enhancing 
technology. Our results further support these findings. Farmers who knew in advance that their 
products would be graded by an external entity invested more in quality-enhancing technology. 
The grading service was introduced free of charge, thereby decreasing the expected inspection 
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cost of onions--taking the form of sometimes lengthy discussions with intermediaries regarding 
the quality of their onions  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information about the 
production and sale of onions in our study area, the Senegal River Valley in northern Senegal. In 
section 3, we detail our study design, including the various interventions, identification 
strategies, and data collected. Section 4 presents results on technology adoption by farmers, 
while section 5 focuses on market outcomes. Section 6 concludes with an epilogue on the 
sustainability of the market reforms. 
2. Study Setting 
2.1. Context 
Onions are used basically daily in every single Senegalese kitchen. For years, the estimated 
150,000 tons consumed annually were supplied mostly by imports from the Netherlands. Every 
year since the early 2000s, the Senegalese government has attempted to create incentives for the 
local production of onions through a seven-month ban on onion imports (from February to 
August), the development of new irrigation schemes, input subsidies, and technical support from 
national and regional extension agencies (ISRAiv and SAEDv). In the Senegal River Valley, 
onion is now competing with tomatoes as the second most important crop for acreage, after rice. 
The Podor department, where our study takes place, is several hundred kilometers distant from 
the main consumer markets in Dakar, Touba, and Saint-Louis (Figure 1). There, onion 
production covered 350 hectares in 1990 and 3,500 hectares a decade later. Onion is mostly 
cultivated on irrigated perimeters, with a cycle ranging from 75 to 90 days from transplantation 
to harvest, depending on varieties, inputs used, and temperature. In our data, farmers started 
planting onions as early as October 4th 2013 and until February 29th 2014 for the last one. While 
relatively straightforward to cultivate, onion size depends on planting density and type of 
fertilizers used for top-dressing, which in turn affects quality. In particular, SAED (the main 
extension agency in the Senegal River Valley) recommends four applications of fertilizers: at 
transplanting time and 20, 40, and 60 days after transplanting. The type of fertilizer 
recommended includes organic fertilizer or urea jointly with a cover of 10-10-20 (nitrogen, 
phosphorus, potassium) chemical fertilizer. Overall, the per-hectare recommendation is of 100kg 
of urea and 200kg of 10-10-20 fertilizer. Studies have however found that farmers make 
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excessive use of urea in order to increase yields. In contrast, potassium which is a key element to 
produce higher quality and lower perishability is largely under-applied (Duteurtre, Faye, and 
Dièye, 2010). 
While onion production receives important support from the SAED, all actors agree that 
commercialization remains a major constraint contributing to reduced benefits for farmers. 
Spatial arbitrage opportunities are limited for farmers due to high transportation costs.vi Time 
arbitrage opportunities are also scarce due to the high perishability of onions produced locally 
and lack of storage facilities. Once harvested, onions would need to be sold within the next one 
or two days to avoid deterioration.vii To facilitate exchanges between producers and buyers, 
commercialization largely rests on the use of consignment agents (coaxers) who sell on behalf of 
producers to itinerant traders (banabanas) generally without assuming property of the product. 
Coaxers are residents of local village communities, with accurate information on availability of 
mature onions among local farmers. Historically, coaxers would bring banabanas to farmers’ 
field for farm-gate transactions. With the increase in local production, banabanas have 
increasingly been using large trucks with little possibility of reaching remote farmers’ fields. 
Instead, 60 to 70 percent of all transactions occur at local collection points where farmers leave 
their onions on consignment with coaxers, who are remunerated a flat fee per (presumed) 40-
kilogram bag upon selling the onions to banabanas.  There, most farmers complain that prices are 
highly volatile depending on daily levels of supply and demand (Figure 2), quality is not 
recognized, coaxers are not providing enough effort (with eventual suspicions of cheating in 
reporting prices to farmers), and the market power of banabanas is a source of graft and rent 
extraction from producers. Although farm-gate commercialization is preferred by the majority of 
farmers, most are forced to bring their onions to collection points where the probability of selling 
quickly is higher--a point of importance with rapidly degrading produce once harvested.   
Transactions in wholesale and retail markets (mainly in Dakar, Touba, and Saint-Louis) are 
organized around criteria of origin, variety, quality, and weight. This is also the case at collection 
points in production zones closer to wholesale and consumer markets, where each transaction is 
duly weighed and inspected for quality by the parties. Only in the department of Podor are 
transactions based on fuzzier assessments. While most onions are of the same variety, there were 
traditionally no scales to assess the actual weight of each bag. Informal weight assessment was 
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part of the negotiation process between coaxers and traders, with farmers overfilling their bags in 
expectation of higher prices and more rapid sales. In our data, the average weight of bags was 
42.7 kilograms before the introduction of scales, with close to 90 percent of the bags weighing 
more than 40 kilograms. Producers have long complained about the absence of scales, but 
coaxers argued that introducing scales would reduce visits by traders in such distant markets, 
implicitly acknowledging that traders benefited from a system without scales.viii 
2.2. Intervention and Data 
In late 2013, Podor’s local authorities decided to introduce scales at local collection points, 
provided by the local onion producer association (APOVix). Supported by an external 
development intervention, the scales were to be operational at the beginning of the upcoming 
2014 commercialization season. In collaboration with SAED, we organized training sessions for 
the 34 villages in the area from which farmers had brought onions to the three collection points 
in the previous year. The training focused on quality-enhancing technologies and practices in the 
cultivation of onions, including optimal fertilizer use for quality onions. In each village, the 
training was announced publicly several days in advance and all farmers were invited to attend. 
Although the region is characterized by relatively high access to extension services provided by 
SAED, this training ensured that all producers in the area had a similar level of information 
about how to produce high-quality onions. 
In late January 2014, we randomly chose half of these villages for a follow-up information 
campaign whereby we informed onion producers about the upcoming introduction of scales at 
the three local collection points. Given our small sample size, villages were first grouped in 
quintiles based on the number of onion producers who had participated in the training campaign 
(a proxy for the total number of producers in the village). In each quintile, half of the villages 
were allocated treatment status (a public meeting was organized to provide producers with 
information about the upcoming system of weight and quality labeling), and the other half were 
kept as controls. As before, meetings were announced several days in advance and all local 
producers were invited to attend. Producers in this treatment group were told that at each of the 
three collection points, scales would be installed early in the season and operated by external 
agents from the local University Gaston Berger (UGB). These agents would also assess the 
quality of onions brought to collection points based on the share of good-/medium-/low-quality 
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onions in each bag. Specifically, scales operators would be trained to assess the quality of onions 
based on their size, compactness, and deterioration. Bags would then be labeled with information 
about weight and quality. Coaxers would still be in charge of sales to traders. This village-level 
random variation in access to information about the upcoming scales constitutes our main source 
of variation, enabling us to assess how farmers’ production decisions vary in response to reforms 
in the market on which they are selling their onions. As described above, fertilizer applications 
occur throughout the growth cycle of onions – recommended at transplanting time and 20, 40, 
and 60 days after. With the earliest planting time being October 4th and the latest February 29th, 
the information campaign differentially affected farmers. Some received the information when 
all fertilizer rounds had likely been implemented and for them the information campaign could 
only affect their decision to sort their onions before taking them to market. For other farmers, the 
information came when some of the fertilizer applications remained to be done, and for some 
before planting time.x  
By February 2014, eight scales were purchased and placed at the collection points, with 
operators hired and trained by UGB. For the scales to effectively start operating, however, a 
formal decision by the head of the local administration needed to be taken in a meeting gathering 
representatives of farmers and coaxers. The meeting was postponed several times until late April 
2014, well into the commercialization season. It was then decided that scales would operate but 
that farmers and coaxers would be free to use them or not. 
On May 2, UGB agents started operating the scales and assessing the quality of bags, with a 
separate group of enumerators collecting information about weight, quality, and price obtained 
for each transaction.xi For their first 10 days of operation, the scale operators merely provided the 
weighing and quality assessment service to farmers upon arrival at the market with their onions 
to be sold. Starting on the 11th day (May 12, 2014), each onion bag that went through a scale 
was duly labeled with a tag reporting its weight and its (externally assessed) quality. This time 
discontinuity in the effective implementation of the market reforms enabled us to assess how 
changes in production strategies by farmers were effectively rewarded through better prices. By 
the end of May, the season was essentially over, and data collection on markets stopped. 
Our final sample includes 533 transactions that occurred during the month of May 2014 at the 
three collection points of Podor and that went through the weighting and quality-assessment 
9 
 
system. For 75 percent of these transactions, onions originated from villages targeted by the 
randomized information campaign of January 2014. As can be seen in Figure 3, this imbalance 
does not seem to vary significantly during the time period considered, in particular before and 
after introduction of labels on the weighed bags. It is clear, however, that the number of 
transactions drastically decreases in the second half of May as the season comes to an end. 
Figure 4 further illustrates the particularly high instability of prices toward the end of the 
commercialization season in the Senegal River Valley. Here we report the evolution of prices at 
the closest collection point to our study sites, the closest one where scales were already operating 
in previous seasons. This market is more than 50 kilometers away from Podor, on the main road 
toward major wholesale and retail markets. There, scales had been operating for several years 
such that the price level is unlikely to have been affected by the introduction of scales at the 
Podor collection points. If anything, Figure 4 suggests the likely sharp natural rise in prices at the 
Podor collection points, even without the introduction of scales. 
In August 2014, we visited all 200 farmers who had sold their onions at the market during the 
month of May and used the weighing and labeling system in place.xii Information collected 
covered issues related to planting, fertilizer, irrigation, and postharvest sorting, along with the 
recalled dates of these operations. Our sample covered only farmers and coaxers who effectively 
chose that their onions be weighed and quality assessed. Figure 5 summarizes the timeline for the 
various treatment and data collection efforts, along with their corresponding duration of coverage 
(see section 6 for a discussion and test of sample selectivity issues). 
2.3. Experimental Integrity 
This section reports on implementation of the information campaign and validates the 
experimental design. At the village level, Table 1 reports on producers’ knowledge of the scales 
and labels intervention. By the time we conducted the survey (August 2014, that is, well after the 
end of the season), virtually everyone knew about the introduction of scales and labels in both 
targeted and non-targeted villages. Yet one finds clear differences in the sources of this 
information and the timing when it was made available to farmers in the treatment and control 
villages. In treatment villages, 53 percent of respondents report learning about the scales and 
labels through the information campaign, which occurred at the end of January. This is 
confirmed by a similar proportion (51 percent) reporting learning about the change in January.xiii  
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A large fraction of producers in treatment villages only learnt about the introduction of scales 
later in the year – in April and May in particular – either from relatives or coaxers, or upon 
taking their onions to the market. In effect, while all villagers were invited to attend the meeting 
of the information campaign, attendance was only partial. More surprising however is the fact 
that information did not rapidly spread to non-attendees within the same village. 18 percent of 
the farmers in non-targeted villages learned about the introduction of scales and labels through 
the campaign. Because the meeting was announced several days in advance, farmers from these 
villages may have heard about it and decided to attend in neighboring targeted villages. The vast 
majority of farmers from these villages however learnt about upcoming scales and labels through 
other means, and 42 percent only found out about it upon delivering their onions to markets.  
Compliance with our randomized design is thus imperfect, with a 35 percentage-point difference 
in rate of access through the information campaign between treatment and control group farmers. 
In return, farmers from control villages were 21 percentage more likely to have only learnt about 
the introduction of scales and labels upon delivering their onions to the market. Yet, we find 
important differences in farmers reported changes in production behavior upon learning about 
these market changes. According to farmers themselves, less than 25 percent in control villages 
changed their production decisions in response to this information, compared to 79 percent in 
treatment villages.xiv Thus, and despite imperfect compliance in attendance rate, the information 
campaign had significantly higher effect on producers’ behavior in treatment than in control 
villages. Among those who changed, 48 percent revised their use of fertilizers (often referred to 
as “moving out of urea”), 13 percent say they used better irrigation, 2 percent say they used 
better seeds, and 52 percent say that they sorted their onions better. Those who received the 
information late in the season are more likely to have only improved their sorting of onions, 
while those who accessed the information campaign in January are more likely to have also 
changed their choice of fertilizer. 
Next, we assess the similarity of farmers’ characteristics and production choices before the 
information campaign. Planting-related decisions are unlikely to be affected by the information 
campaign, as most planting occurs from November to January and the information related to 
scales and labels only came at the end of January (in our data, 95 percent of the plots were 
planted before the date of the information campaign). As reported in Table 2, we do not find 
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significant differences between treatment and control villages related to the number of plots, total 
area planted with onions, or date of planting. We further assess whether farmers from treatment 
and control villages started with the same initial level of knowledge about onion production. The 
extension campaign reached only about one in three farmers in both treatment and control 
villages. Asked about key aspects of this training, farmers in treatment and control villages gave 
similar answers on average, with the exception of whether one should harvest onions with or 
without their leaves. Last, we find that a large proportion of farmers in both treatment and 
control villages have a good idea of onion prices in Dakar before they bring their own to the 
local collection points. Overall, we do not find evidence of systematic differences between 
producers in treatment and control villages in pre-treatment behavior or in characteristics that are 
unlikely to be affected by treatment. 
 
3. Information and Producers’ Behavior 
As shown in Table 1, 79 percent of the farmers in treatment villages reported that knowing about 
the upcoming introduction of scales and labels affected their production decisions. In most cases, 
these changes related to the type of fertilizer used and whether they would sort their onions 
before bringing them to the collection points. This section further explores the magnitude of 
these effects. We rely on ordinary least squares–based Intention-To-Treat (ITT) estimates, where 
the dependent variable is regressed on village-level treatment allocation. Our reliance on ITT 
estimates instead of an Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) ones is motivated by our 
limited ability to assess when farmers were affected by the information in their production 
process, given that many cultivate several plots planted at different time, and many heard about 
the scales and labels through other means. Use of an ITT estimate as opposed to an ATT is also 
made necessary by the possibility of selection bias should the non-uptakers systematically differ 
from the uptakers of the intervention. 
Because the treatment is allocated at the village level, standard errors are correspondingly 
clustered at this level. Specifically, we report two separate estimations of standard errors. Our 
main specification relies on standard Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent clustering of 
standard errors at the village level. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show, however, 
that this clustering approach still leads to downward-biased estimates of standard errors for 
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samples with relatively few clusters (less than 30). Given our relatively small sample (31 
clusters), we also compute more conservative randomized inference-based estimates of standard 
errors as robustness checks of our results. For this, we randomly switch the treatment allocation 
across clusters to estimate the distribution of parameter estimates across placebo allocations of 
treatment across clusters. We use this distribution to produce a one-sided test of hypothesis by 
locating the value of our true parameter estimate within the distribution of all possible ones. This 
approach – equivalent to a Fisher exact test – usually relies on the computation of parameter 
estimates for all possible allocation of treatment across groups. In our case, however, there are 
over 300 million such possibilities across our 31 clusters. Instead, we use in each estimation a set 
of 1000 resampling of treatment allocations to produce our test. P-value results of these tests for 
key parameters of interest are provided below each concerned table, all confirming the results 
obtained using the Huber-White clustering of standard errors.  
 The data in this section exclusively rely on the August 2014 survey of the 200 farmers who 
transacted on the three collection points in May and whose onions were weighed with the scales. 
In Table 3 we first report the means and standard deviations of the variables used later in this 
section for the control group. Accordingly, we find that the average planting date lies far ahead 
of the information campaign. In our sample, 95 percent of the fields were planted before January 
23, limiting the scope for any impact of the information campaign on production decisions. On 
average, onions were ready to be harvested by April 2, 2014. Onions do not need to be harvested 
right away, however, and can stay in the field for an additional one to three weeks without much 
damage. The deterioration rate accelerates a lot once the onion has been picked from the field. 
Still, with the average onion plot being harvested in mid-April, the effective introduction of 
labels on May 12 did miss most of the season’s production. 
Table 3 further indicates high levels of fertilizer application. In effect, we did not survey a single 
producer who had not used at least one type of fertilizer in his or her onion field. Urea is by far 
the most commonly used, followed by 9-23-30. The use of 10-10-20 fertilizer, which is the 
number one recommendation by SAED for top-dressing, is comparatively very low in terms of 
both occurrence and volume (extensive and intensive margins). Last, a very high proportion of 
farmers reported sorting their onion harvests before bringing them to the local collection points. 
Accordingly, for 92 percent of the transactions originating from farmers in the control group, 
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onions had been sorted before being brought to the consignment agent. Clearly, however, this 
binary variable could mask important heterogeneity in the extent of sorting. 
In Tables 4, 5, and 6, we report estimates of the impact of living in a village chosen to receive 
information about the upcoming scales and labels in late January 2014. We first assess whether 
farmers revised their planting plans. In Table 2 we did not find that farmers from these villages 
differed in terms of the number and size of plots allocated to onion production. In Table 4, we do 
not uncover further evidence that information affected decisions about when to plant fields nor 
when to harvest. 
In contrast, Table 5 reports a significant effect of the information campaign on fertilizer use. 
Two-thirds of fertilizer applications in control villages occurred after the date of the information 
campaign. Overall, fertilizer applications were more likely to be affected by treatment than were 
planting decisions. We find that treatment is associated with a 9 percentage-point decrease in the 
likelihood that a household used urea as a fertilizer, although we do not find a clear effect on the 
quantity of urea used. In contrast, our results show a large increase in the likelihood of using 10-
10-20 fertilizer. Farmers in treatment villages are 27 percentage points more likely to have used 
such type of fertilizer (a close to 100 percent increase from the control group), and there was a 
116 kilogram per hectare increase in the quantity used of this fertilizer (a more than 250 percent 
increase). We do not find any meaningful effect of the information campaign on the use of 9-23-
30. This result on the shift in fertilizer use from urea (good for yields) to 10-10-20 (good for 
quality) is a major indication of the channel through which quality response has been achieved. 
Last, Table 6 reports estimates of the extent to which farmers affected the timing of their sales 
and increased their sorting of onions before bringing them to collection points. We find no 
evidence that the month of sales is different across farmers in treatment and control villages. 
Regarding sorting, we found above that the initial level is very high to start with, likely due to a 
broad assessment of what sorting entailed. While the initial objective was to capture whether 
farmers gathered good, medium, and low quality onions into separate bags, it is likely that this 
question was understood as farmers merely removing overly rotten onions and foreign matter 
from the bags. As discussed in Section 2, 52 percent of the farmers indicated having improved 
their sorting of onions in response to information on scales and labeling facilities at the markets. 
The transaction-level data used in Table 6 is unlikely to fully capture these improvements. 
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Nevertheless, Table 6 suggests a positive increase in the sorting of onions among farmers in 
treatment villages. Important to note, this effect is limited to the month of May, when scales and 
labeling were effectively operating. In effect, farmers typically call up their coaxers before 
bringing their onions to market. Those informed about the upcoming scales may have asked 
whether the scales were in place and only if so engaged in further sorting of their onions. 
Without this information, or without higher-quality onions derived from enhanced use of 
appropriate fertilizer, farmers in control villages had a lower incentive to increase sorting of their 
onions during the month of May 2014. 
Overall, results in this section point to a rapid and meaningful reaction of farmers to the 
information they received about installation of scales and quality labeling at local collection 
points. Despite a relatively small sample and a one-time-only information campaign, we find 
clear evidence that farmers have changed their production behavior in response to incentives to 
quality through use of dedicated fertilizer and sorting of onions. These results are reinforced by 
the fact that impact is not observed for decisions that could not be affected by the campaign 
(planting time) or when scales were not yet active (sorting). 
 
4. Information and Market Outcomes 
As established in the previous section, the treatment-induced changes in producer behavior are 
mainly driven by changes in the type and quantity of fertilizer used. Increased use of 10-10-20 
and decreased use of urea are expected to generate higher-quality, denser, heavier-per-volume, 
though less voluminous onions. We assess the extent to which changes in producer behavior 
translate into higher prices for their produce. We rely on data collected at the scale and 
transaction level at the three collection points. Each transaction was matched with the producer’s 
village of origin, which enables us to assess the effect of the information campaign on market 
outcomes. Results are reported in Table 7. 
We first assess whether onions brought to collection points by producers from treatment villages 
were in effect of higher quality than those originating from control villages. Scale operators were 
trained by SAED to measure onion quality by emptying one in every five bags, separating the 
bag’s content into high- and low-quality onions, and assessing the respective proportions within 
the bag. xv If the proportion of high-quality onions surpassed an established threshold, the bag 
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was deemed of good quality as well as the next four bags of the same producer. If not, it was 
assessed of low quality as were the next four bags. This exogenous quality measurement, 
independent from ongoing negotiations between producers, coaxers, and traders, enables us to 
trace producers’ decisions on the quality of their onions in the market. Results in the first column 
indicate a 16 percentage-point higher chance of onions’ being of good quality if originating from 
a treatment village (from a level of 8 percent in the control villages). Thus, there is a clear effect 
of farmers’ production decisions on the quality of their onions. Results in the second column 
show that once labels have been introduced, 43 percent (though not significant) of the treatment 
effect is accounted for by the effect of labeling. This likely comes from additional sorting once 
scales and labels were in place. 
In the third column, we assess the extent to which such quality increases translated into price 
increases over the entire month of May.xvi With the naturally occurring variation in prices in the 
second half of the month (cf. Figure 4), we control for the transaction’s date with linear and 
quadratic terms. We do not find a clear effect of the information campaign on prices received by 
producers throughout the period. 
Recall that although operating from May 2, scale agents did not start labeling bags with weight 
and quality information until May 12. Until then, traders did not access weight and quality 
measures, and onions were sold by the bag as previously in the season. If, as believed by 
producers, scales would make quality-enhancing investments more remunerative, one should 
observe these effects after labels were properly introduced. We test for this effect in columns 4 to 
7 with a difference-in-differences approach where the interacted term between the use of labels 
and being from a treatment village gives the effect on price of introducing scales and labels at the 
collection points, inclusive of producers’ behavioral responses to these changes. 
In column 4, we first verify that there was no premium to the higher quality of onions from 
treatment markets ahead of the introduction of labels. We do this with a test of parallel trends 
over the period before the introduction of labels. Taking as a placebo the label introduction date 
in the middle of the period (day –4), we do not find any evidence of differentially evolving price 
trends for onions in treatment and control villages. 
In columns 5 to 7, we assess the price effect of duly introduced labels on May 12. In column 5, a 
bandwidth of +/– 4 days from May 12 yields the minimum mean square error and is thus 
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considered optimal. We test for the robustness of these results with half and double bandwidths 
in columns 6 and 7, respectively. We find clear evidence of the combined effect of labeling and 
the information campaign on prices received. In the four days following the introduction of 
labels, farmers from treatment villages received an average extra FCFA 10.6 for each kilogram 
of onion. This corresponds to a 9 percent increase from the overall per-kilogram price. 
The same results hold when considering a smaller bandwidth in column 6. Results are, however, 
lower in magnitude in column 7, when the bandwidth considered runs from –8 to +8 days around 
May 12. Together these results suggest that quality premiums are lower toward the end of the 
season when the growing scarcity of supply becomes the main driver of prices. 
We further verify that the external assessment of quality as reported in labeling, with 
classification of bags into three categories from best to worst, corresponds to what wholesale 
agents are looking for in their transactions. In Table 8, we correlate the external quality indicator 
with banabanas’ own quality assessments of the same bags. Results show that label categories 
have strong predictive power of banabanas’ own quality assessment, with categories 2 and 3 in 
banabanas’ assessment scoring increasingly lower on UGB agents’ quality assessment. As 
column 2 suggests, this correspondence in quality assessment is fully conveyed by the 
introduction of labels. Last, we further verify the relationship between externally assessed quality 
and price and the role that labels have in transmitting this information. In Table 9, we see that 
externally assessed quality is positively correlated with price, further providing an upper bound 
estimate of the impact of the information campaign. As column 2 shows, this price effect is 
mainly the result of the introduction of labels. 
5. Costs and Benefits 
With onions of potentially smaller size, it is unclear whether the FCFA 10 premium per kilogram 
measured in Table 7 is sufficient to cover the cost of investing in the technology. In this section, 
we compute an average cost-benefit analysis. We have individual producer information on 
hectares planted, number of bags produced, and quantity of fertilizer used.  We however only 
have information on weight per bag and price received for the subset of transactions that took 
place after the scales were put into place, and on input price at the market level.  We thus 
combine these data to compute an estimated average difference in revenues per hectare between 
farmers in treatment and control groups.   
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The (subsidized) price of urea in the area is FCFA 167 per kilogram, while each kilogram of 10-
10-20 costs FCFA 200—a 19 percent difference. However, the unsubsidized price of urea in the 
region is FCFA 240 per kilogram, 20 percent higher than the cost of 10-10-20. In the following 
estimates, we assume that all farmers have access to the subsidized price and discuss the 
implication of subsidies at the end of the section. Using results from column 4 in Table 5, this 
represents a FCFA 4,408 increase in production cost per hectare. 
The increase in quality may come at the cost of a lower overall quantity harvested. Our survey 
setting did not allow for the weighing of farmers’ total harvest, nor could we measure the volume 
of each bag. Although these bags are standard, farmers decide whether to overfill them or not. 
From casual observations, we did not observe that bags of onions from treatment villages—of 
higher quality on average—were less filled than bags from control villages. Furthermore, with a 
fixed price per bag and payment by kilogram, farmers in treatment villages had no incentive to 
decrease their filling of bags. Thus, we hypothesize an homogeneous volume of bags between 
treatment and control villages. 
Using information collected on markets, we estimate in Table 10 the relationship between quality 
and weight (column 1) and the impact of the information campaign on the weight of each bag 
(column 2). Results are consistent with agronomic predictions in that bags of higher-quality 
onions weigh more than bags of lower-quality onions. The magnitude is, however, relatively 
small: bags of 42 kilograms on average for the lower-quality type are only 0.86 kilogram heavier 
when filled with onions of better quality (a mere 2 percent difference in weight). Results in 
column 2 are consistent in sign and magnitude with bags from treatment villages weighing 
slightly more than those coming from control villages, although the coefficient is less precisely 
estimated. 
Turning to production levels, we assess in Table 11 the changes induced by the information 
campaign on the quantity of onions harvested per hectare, at the plot level, relying on recall data 
from farmers and measured in number of bags. Our results show no overall effect of the 
information campaign on farmers’ overall harvest (columns 1 and 2) or yields per hectare 
(columns 3, 4, and 5). This result in itself contradicts common beliefs held by farmers in the area 
that change of fertilizer type, from urea to 10-10-20, would lead to large declines in volumes 
harvested.  
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Assuming that other production costs are constant across treatment and control villages (we did 
not find impact on the number of irrigation rounds per plot), one may use the above numbers to 
assess the overall impact of the information campaign on farmers’ onion revenues. The average 
farmer produced 239 bags of onions per hectare in both control and treatment villages. The 
average bag in control villages weighed 42.2 kilograms, giving a total harvest of 239  42.2 = 
10,086 kilograms per hectare in the control group and 239  (42.2 + 0.68) = 10,248 kilograms 
per hectare in the treatment group. Farmers in treatment villages invested FCFA 4,408 more per 
hectare in 10-10-20 than did those in control villages, that is, 4408/10,248 = FCFA 0.43 per 
kilogram harvested. On selling in markets with operating scales, onions from treatment villages 
were priced FCFA 10.6 higher than those from control villages for which the average price was 
FCFA 115 per kilogram at the time the scales were introduced. 
Overall, the difference in revenues per hectare between farmers in treatment and control groups 
is given by (10,248 × (114 + 10.6 − 0.42)) − 10,086 × 114 =  FCFA 122,793 (a 10.7 percent 
increase in income per hectare compared to the control group), although there is a likely smaller 
increase in benefits per hectare once the costs of other inputs are subtracted.  
 
Four caveats are worth mentioning with respect to these calculations. First, we implicitly assume 
that the price premium received upon the introduction of labels would have been the same had 
the scales been introduced earlier. Anecdotal evidence however suggest that, given the low 
supply, end of season price premium for quality output tends to be lower than at the height of the 
season when supply is abundant. We therefore hypothesize that the price premium would likely 
have been higher had the labeling been authorized earlier. Second, farmers may have changed 
other production practices in response to their change in fertilizer use. While we did not find 
changes in irrigation cycles or area planted, we are unable to account for other potential changes 
that could affect production costs. Third, the price premium obtained in the previous sections 
could be different had all farmers been aware of the introduction of scales. Such local general 
equilibrium effects have long been discussed in the literature related to shallow agricultural 
markets as a potential explanation for the limited uptake of yield increasing technologies (e.g., 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). Finally, because the quality premiums are unknown ex-ante, risk 
aversion will dampen technology adoption regardless of net returns. 
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6. Selection Issues 
Our sample of transactions and of producers undertaking these transactions is not representative 
of the overall population selling onions at the collection points considered. A significant number 
of producers did not use the scales to weigh and eventually label their onions and are therefore 
not recorded in our dataset. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, on being offered the opportunity 
of using a scale and labeling, producers with lower-quality onions decided to sell directly to 
banabanas on the basis of volume. Furthermore, a number of consignment agents boycotted the 
use of scales for all the onions they were responsible of selling on behalf of farmers.  
If true, this self-selection issue implies that our analysis compares farmers producing the best-
quality onions in villages targeted by the information campaign to the best-quality producers in 
control villages. Using the list of 2,430 producers who sold their onions at collection points in 
the 2013 season, we find that 10 percent of the farmers in treatment villages used a scale and 
labeling in the next season, while 2 percent of the farmers in control villages did.xvii If anything, 
this selection suggests that part of the recorded producers from treatment villages would have 
produced lower-quality onions than those from control villages, had they not had access to the 
information campaign. Comparison of recorded producers between treatment and control groups 
would thus produce a downward bias on our estimate of prices obtained on the markets. 
We assess the extent to which selection issues may bias our results using data from the previous 
campaign on the same markets—a campaign wherein no scales were introduced on the market. 
At the same time, we recorded basic characteristics of transactions from farmers selling at 
collection points, including the number of bags sold on a given transaction, the price obtained, 
whether the producer had sorted his or her onions for quality, as well as his or her phone number. 
Telephone numbers were also recorded in the dataset used in this paper, enabling a matching of 
our sample of producers with the larger sample of producers who sold on the market in the 
previous year. This enables us to compare the characteristics of producers using the scales and 
labeling when they became available to the characteristics of those who decided not to use them. 
Results are presented in Table 12. We do not find any clear evidence of selection in column 1 or 
in column 2 upon adding coaxer fixed effects. If anything, results suggest that those who sold 
more onions at collection points in 2013 were less likely to have used the scales in the following 
season. Coaxer fixed effects (not reported here) are in large part highly significant, further 
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suggesting that the choice of using scales was in fact largely decided by coaxers, some of whom 
simply decided to boycott the scheme. While most producers interviewed indicated that they felt 
free to change coaxer upon dissatisfaction with their services, our data indicate that 80 percent of 
producers had relied on the same coaxer to sell their onions in the previous four seasons. 
Furthermore, in 40 percent of the cases, producers and coaxers have family ties and in 26 percent 
of the cases they live in the same village. Thus, relational contracts between producers and 
coaxers likely contribute to explain the fact that most producers followed their coaxers’ 
suggestion of using the grading system or not. Results in column 3 indicate an overrepresentation 
of treatment producers in our sample as compared to controls, although we did not uncover clear 
evidence that this selection is based on the farmer characteristics that we rely upon here. This is 
seen in columns 4 and 5 where marginally significant relationships using standard clustering of 
standard errors are clearly rejected based on randomized inference estimates.  
7. Epilogue 
Scales and quality labeling were introduced in 2014 at the Podor onion collection points to make 
those engaging in transactions better informed about quantities and qualities, and transactions 
more transparent. We used a field experiment to assess producers’ responses to quality 
recognition in market transactions. Results show that this created significant gains for producers 
as weighing and labeling induced higher quality that was rewarded by higher price. Producers 
responded to quality recognition by using more quality-enhancing, instead of volume-enhancing, 
fertilizers and engaging in more sorting of onions to grade bags by quality level. Higher prices 
with no declines in yields led to significant income gains for farmers. This suggests that African 
smallholder farmers can respond to price incentives by adjusting both their production and 
marketing practices. 
With these positive results creating efficiency and equity gains, it should come as a surprise that 
the process of weighing and labeling was abandoned in the following cropping season. 
Understanding why this happened requires assessing the political economy of relationships 
between the four categories of agents involved in the onion value chain: producers, coaxers, 
banabanas, and local development agencies. A survey of opinions revealed the following 
responses to the experiment. 
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Producers indicated strong appreciation for the initiative. Weighing was seen as important to 
them because they knew that there was extensive cheating by banabanas, with presumed 40-
kilogram bags needing to be overfilled to be sold and reaching on average an extra un-
remunerated 7 percent. Quality recognition was also important to them as a source of additional 
revenue, especially through labeling endorsed by third-party verification, in this case the UGB 
team overseeing the labeling process. 
Coaxers were divided about the issue due to fears of free-riding creating advantage for some of 
them over others. Coaxers’ main objective is to sell rapidly to banabanas the onion bags on 
consignment with them. Their concern is to deter banabanas from exercising their fallback 
options, namely, buying at the farm-gate instead of the collection point, shifting their purchases 
to other collection points, or buying from coaxers who do not use scales. Typical of a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation, each of them has more to gain from defaulting until a regulatory authority 
would impose respect of the new system on all coaxers. Survey of opinions thus found some 
coaxers agreeing with the system and others categorically rejecting it. 
Banabanas are the ones with market power in these distant markets, and they are the main losers 
from greater market transparency. They voiced quasi-unanimous opposition to the system. They 
were able to exercise enough pressure on coaxers and regional authorities to make sure that the 
system would be discontinued and not universally extended to all collection points. 
Local development agencies have been shown to be effective in delivering technical assistance to 
farmers. They were able to gather farmers and work with their local organizations to offer 
training in quality response and storage. They were, however, not able to intervene in regulating 
local markets and imposing new rules to coordinate agents on behalf of the collective good. This 
may in part be due to the fact that national markets remain highly unstable with erratic 
government interventions in import policies that undermine price expectations on local markets. 
This may also derive from lack of political representation of farmers’ interests that the local 
agencies could use to press for policy reforms. 
In the end, what we see is that market reforms that make transactions better informed and more 
transparent can be effective in inducing technology adoption by smallholder farmers but that 
they need effective regulatory power to be implemented. In spite of this temporary setback in our 
study area, use of scales is prevalent on onion markets throughout the country, as shown in 
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Figure 1. Experimental introduction of scales and labeling where they were not yet present has 
allowed us to show that they create large gains for farmers. We can thus expect that it is only a 
matter of time for scales and labeling to be introduced all the way to the more distant markets 
such as our study area. 
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Figure 1. Study zone 
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Figure 2. Evolution of daily mean prices at three Podor collection points in the 2013 season--
price per estimated 40 kilogram bag 
 
 
Source: Price data collected by authors in the 2013 onion commercialization season  
(one year prior to the current study). 
Note: Apr = April; May = May 
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Figure 3. Number of transactions recorded per treatment arm during May 
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Figure 4. End-of-season evolution of prices--price per kilogram of onion 
   
Note: Data are from the collection point closest to the study site. Dates are centered around May 12  
when labels were introduced on bags. 
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Figure 5. Study timeline 
  
 
Note: Dec = December; Jan = January. Period is October 2013 to August 2014. There is a three-month growing season between planting and harvesting. 
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Table 1. Access to information about the introduction of scales, by treatment and control villages 
Information Control villages Treatment 
villages 
Difference: p-
value 
     
% who know about introduction of scales 97.44 98.75 t-test: .548 
     
% who learned about it through    
 Information campaign 18.42 53.46  
 Friends/relatives 23.68 11.32  
 Coaxer 15.79 13.21  
 On delivery 42.11 20.75  
 Other 0.00 1.26 KS-test: .001 
     
% who learned about it in the month of    
 January 21.05 50.94  
 February 13.16 3.14  
 March 5.26 2.52  
 April 47.37 32.70  
 May 13.16 9.43  
 Doesn’t know 0.00 0.63 KS-test: .008  
     
% who changed production behavior since learned 
about scales 
23.08 78.80 t-test: .000 
n  39 161  
KS-test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution. T-test: Student test for equality of proportions 
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Table 2. Tests of balance (household level) 
 
 
n Mean 
treatment 
Mean 
control 
Difference: 
p value 
Total number of bags harvested 200 177.97 146.12 .56 
Total area cultivated in onions (hectares) 198 0.67 0.58 .58 
Number of plots cultivated in onions 200 1.51 1.52 .99 
     
Respondent attended training on quality 199 0.33 0.29 .67 
Respondent’s knowledge about means to enhance onion quality    
- One should use herbicides 165 1.00 0.98 .12 
- One should harvest with leaves 200 0.54 0.84 .00 
- Kilograms of base fertilizer to use per hectare 175 206.76 205.07 .85 
- Number of days after planting to start irrigation  200 17.23 16.44 .54 
- Number of weeks after planting for first 
fertilizer application 
199 20.03 19.74 .82 
- Recommended number of fertilizer applications 200 3.08 3.22 .43 
- Number of days before harvest for last 
irrigation 
200 20.00 19.07 .53 
- One should use mostly urea as fertilizer (%) 200 5.13 3.73 .71 
- One should use mostly 10-10-20 as fertilizer 
(%) 
200 30.77 34.78 .55 
- One should use mostly 9-23-30 as fertilizer (%) 200 51.28 46.58 .57 
     
Respondent generally knows prices in consumer markets 
(%) 
200 0.54 0.65 .23 
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Table 3. Mean of dependent variables in control group 
 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
   
Date planted December 
16, 2013 
27 days 
Date ready to 
harvest 
April 2, 
2014 
24 days 
   
Use urea (0/1) 0.95 0.22 
Kilograms of urea 
per hectare 
218.01 145.56 
Use 10-10-20 (0/1) 0.28 0.45 
Kilograms of 10-10-
20 per hectare 
43.34 96.15 
Use 9-23-30 (0/1) 0.64 0.48 
Kilograms of 9-23-30 
per hectare 
211.87 268.41 
   
Sorted onions 0.92 0.26 
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Table 4. Effect of information campaign on planting and harvesting time (plot level) 
 Date planted Date harvested 
Treatment village 6.706 3.598 
 (4.296) (4.079) 
Constant December 16, 2013 April 2, 2014 
 (3.558)*** (3.566)*** 
R2 .01 .00 
n 303 303 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. ***p < .01. 
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Table 5. Effect of information on overall fertilizer use (household level) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Use urea 
(0/1) 
Kilogra
ms of 
urea per 
hectare  
Use 10-10-
20 (0/1) 
Kilograms 
of 10-10-
20 per 
hectare 
Use 9-23-30 
(0/1) 
Kilograms 
of 9-23-30 
per hectare 
Treatment 
village 
–0.092 45.217  0.271 116.431 –0.014 –0.649 
 (0.051)* (63.187)  (0.118)** (27.871)*** (0.074) (50.059) 
Constant 0.949 218.012  0.282 43.344 0.641 211.870 
 (0.033)*** (28.845)*
** 
(0.102)** (18.404)** (0.069)*** (41.403)*** 
R2 .01 .00  .05 .05 .00 .00 
n 200 198  200 198 200 198 
Mean of 
control group 
0.95 218.01  0.28 43.34 0.64 211.87 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.  
Randomized inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Treatment village=0.10; col 2: Treatment 
village=0.62; col 3: Treatment village=0.01; col 4: Treatment village=0.00; col 5: Treatment village=0.39; col 6: 
Treatment village=0.48 
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Table 6. Effect of information on sorting of onions (transaction level) 
 Month when the 
transaction 
occurred 
1 
Producer reports having sorted onions before 
sales 
 2 3 4 
Treatment village 0.003 0.028 0.026 0.009 
 (0.109) (0.049) (0.048) (0.076) 
Transaction 
occurred in May 
  0.047 0.032 
   (0.020)** (0.033) 
Treatment Village 
 Transaction 
Occurred in May 
   0.076 
   (0.049) 
Constant 4.466 0.925 0.901 0.864 
 (0.104)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.066)*** 
R2 0.00 .00 .01 .04 
n 602 602 602 602 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
Randomized inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Treatment village=0.20; col 2: Treatment 
village=0.22; col 3: Treatment Village x Transaction Occurred in May =0.04 
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Table 7. Market-level impact of the information campaign 
 
Good quality Good quality Price Price Price Price Price 
(full sample) (full sample) (full sample) ]–8,0[ days ]–4,+4[ days ]–2,+2[ days ]–8,+8[ days 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Treatment Village 0.164 0.110 6.509 –1.399 –4.172 –3.936 –4.831 
 (0.056)*** (0.069) (5.181) (3.572) (3.837) (3.387) (2.469)* 
Treatment Village  Labels 
Introduced 
 0.082   10.643 10.438 6.827 
 (0.055)   (4.492)** (4.603)** (3.100)** 
Treatment Village  Placebo 
date for label introduction 
   –2.145    
   (4.064)    
Constant –0.254 –0.179 77.376 97.905 99.102 37.346 140.054 
 (0.094)** (0.115) (7.307)*** (7.286)*** (39.455)** (84.079) (3.717)*** 
R2 .12 .12 .61 .08 .15 .14 .49 
n 543 543 533 223 165 123 320 
Mean of control group 0.08 0.08 141.51 106.77 114.02 113.9 114.94 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All estimates include market dummies, date, and date² terms. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
Randomized inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Treatment village=0.03; col 2: Treatment Village x Labels Introduced =0.17; col 3: Treatment 
Village =0.13; col 4: Treatment Village  Placebo date for label introduction=0.73, col 5: Treatment Village  Labels Introduced=0.00; col 6: Treatment Village 
 Labels Introduced=0.01; col 7: Treatment Village  Labels Introduced=0.01. 
Data contain 543 measurements of quality (columns 1 and 2), but only 533 for price paid (column 3). Discrepancy with column 3 is because we are missing 
information on price for 10 transactions (quality was assessed for all bags going through the scales, but prices were obtained by tracking down these bags for 
later transactions on the market). 
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Table 8. Test of recognition of externally-assessed and banabana-assessed quality 
 
 
Onions are evaluated as good quality by 
University Gaston Berger agents 
Excluded: High quality as assessed by banabanas 
Medium quality –0.177 –0.037 
 (0.051)** (0.112) 
Low quality –0.320 –0.096 
 (0.065)*** (0.119) 
Transaction Occurred after Introduction of Labels  
Medium Quality  –0.177 
  (0.122) 
Low Quality  –0.333 
  (0.121)*** 
Constant 0.111 –0.040 
 (0.091) (0.142) 
R2 .16 .18 
n 476 476 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
All estimates include market dummies, date, and date² terms. 
**p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 9 Impact on price of externally assessed quality and role of labels 
Variable Price per kilogram 
 1 2 
Good quality 23.415 4.775 
 (7.341)*** (2.786)* 
Labels introduced  
Good quality 
 27.763 
 (7.965)*** 
Constant 85.785 90.726 
 (4.089)*** (4.237)*** 
R2 .65 .67 
n 533 533 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *p < .1. ***p < .01. 
All estimates include market dummies, date, and date² terms. Randomized inference-based p-values for 
one-sided test: col 1: Good quality=0.00; col 2: Post-treatment Date  Good quality =0.00. 
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Table 10. Impact of information on weight of bags 
 
Variable 
Kilograms per 
bag 
Kilograms per 
bag 
 1 2 
Good quality 0.804  
 (0.411)*  
Treatment village  0.688 
  (0.524) 
Constant 42.544 42.190 
 (0.236)*** (0.445)*** 
R2 .02 .02 
n 536 536 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *p < .1. ***p < .01. 
Randomized inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Good quality=0.06; col 2: 
Treatment village=0.13. 
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Table 11. Impact of information campaign on volumes harvested 
  
Number of 
bags 
harvested 
Number of 
bags 
harvested 
Bags per 
hectare 
Bags per 
hectare 
Bags per 
hectare 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Treatment village –31.224 –15.449 22.651 26.858 28.38 
 (54.268) (45.033) (27.01) (26.363) (26.096) 
Constant 177.974 161.414 239.159 212.307 215.368 
 (49.873)*** (60.967)** (22.983)*** (43.650)*** (42.030)*** 
n 199 199 302 302 302 
Mean control group 177.97 177.97 239.16 239.16 239.16 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Household fixed 
effects 
  No No Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. **p < .05. ***p < .01. Randomized 
inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Treatment village=0.26; col 2: Treatment 
village=0.38; col 3: Treatment village=0.24; col 4: Treatment village=0.21, col 5: Treatment 
village=0.21  
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Table 12. Issues of selection, using previous year’s data 
 Used scale in 2014 season 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of bags sold in 2013 (000) -0.077 -0.029  -0.056 0.205 
 (0.037)** (0.035)  (0.124) (0.187) 
Price per bag sold in 2013 (000) 0.005 0.008  -0.008 -0.018 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.010) 
Sorted onions before sale in 2013 
0.024 0.026  -0.017 -0.020 
(0.018) (0.017)  (0.027) (0.037) 
      
Treatment village   0.082 -0.014 -0.054 
   (0.035)** (0.041) (0.048) 
      
Treatment Village       
Number of Bags Sold in 2013 (000)    -0.024 -0.242 
    (0.130) (0.195) 
Sorted Onions before Sale in 2013    0.056 0.058 
    (0.033)* (0.041) 
Price per Bag Sold in 2013 (000)    0.016 0.029 
    (0.010) (0.016)* 
Constant 0.055 0.100 0.022 0.065 0.139 
 (0.026)*** (0.060) (0.012)* (0.025)** (0.066)*** 
n 2,429 2,429 2,430 2,429 2,429 
Coaxer fixed effects No Yes No No Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *p < .1. ***p < .01. 
Randomized inference-based p-values for one-sided test: col 1: Number of bags sold in 2013 (000)=0.09; col 3: 
Treatment village=0.08; col 4: Sorted Onions before Sale in 2013=0.20; col 5: Treatment village x Price per Bag 
Sold in 2013 (000)=1,000
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i We are grateful to Assane Sylla and his team for their help in implementing the intervention and ensuring proper data collection. We 
gratefully acknowledge funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation through the Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative.  
 
ii Such scales exist in most onion markets in other parts of the country, including at collection points, wholesale markets, and 
consumer markets. 
iii Specifically, a council gathering local representatives of the State and the Ministry of Agriculture was to be held to formerly grant 
the permission, and four representatives were to be present. The meeting was initially planned for mid-February, but was postponed 
three times, several weeks each time, as one or more of these representatives had to travel for work or personal reasons (to attend 
funerals). At the time, we suspected that the council was being lobbied by some local coaxers not to grant the authorization for scales, 
although we have no formal evidence to support it. 
iv Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole. 
v Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal.  
vi The transportation cost of onions from our study zone to the main consumer outlets in Dakar or Touba reaches FCFA 450 to FCFA 
500 per 40kg bag (roughly equivalent to USD 1 at the time)--a gross 10% of the sale price at collection points. 
vii Data from the 2013 commercialization season suggests that over 90% of the onions were sold within three days after they were 
brought to the collection point. By then, the quality of 10% had deteriorated, with an overall 30% of bags containing a significant 
amount of rotten onions. 
viii While this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, as the epilogue to the paper indicates, the concern about continued servicing of 
these distant markets by traders was indeed legitimate. 
ix Association des Producteurs d’Oignons de la Vallée du Fleuve. 
x Because not all farmers could adjust their fertilizer applications, our results give a lower bound to the information treatment. 
xi Every bag was weighed. Regarding quality assessment, every five bag of a batch of onion bags brought by a producer was emptied 
and each onion allocated to one of three pile: good, medium and low quality. If the pile of good quality onions represented over 80 
percent of the total, the whole bag was classified as high quality. If it represented less than 80 percent but the piles of good and 
medium quality onions together represented over 80 percent of the total, the bag was classified as medium quality. If together, these 
two piles represented less than 80 percent of the total the bag was classified as low quality. The next four bags were classified with the 
same quality label as the sampled one.  
xii For about 25 percent of the recorded transactions, onions were owned by coaxers themselves—most of them having purchased these 
onions from farmers at the farm gate. As they did not specifically engage in production, we did not survey these coaxers. 
xiii The slight discrepancy between the two numbers is due to individuals not remembering precisely the day of the campaign, which 
occurred in late January. 
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
xiv Since only 18% of the farmers in control villages learned of the scales and labels through the campaign while 25% changed their 
production decisions suggests that information also circulated through other channels. This is also the case in treatment villages where 
53% of farmers were informed through the campaign while 79% changed their production or sorting behavior. 
xv Although the UGB agents were trained (by SAED) in evaluating three levels of quality, only two (medium and low) were reported 
in the data. In what follows, we use this distinction as a binary variable indicating whether the bags were of higher or lower quality.  
xvi We analyze here the reduced form effect of treatment on price.  In Table 9 below we will explicitly relate the effect on price to the 
effect on quality. 
xvii Recall that the scales were introduced late in the season, so that most farmers sold at collection points when there were no scales 
installed yet. 
